The "Gains" of September 11th

Some might think this article is only about the gains from the September 11th attacks. But that doesn't make sense when you're analysing an event that shook the entire world. First, you need to list the real losses, then sort through the imaginary "gains," and finally, let the reader decide on the final verdict. This article might shock some and provoke others, but it's a perspective open to discussion, far from the kind of thinking that leads to bloodshed.

A Serious Reality Check

Before we look at any of the outcomes of that event, we have to establish the principles by which we'll judge them. For me, there's nothing more important than the Islamic legal principles of achieving benefits and preventing harm. As Imam al-Shatibi stated: "The laws were set down for the benefit of people, both in this life and the next" [1]. In fact, the entire Sharia (Islamic law) is about benefit, as al-Izz ibn Abd al-Salam said: "All of Sharia is about benefits: either preventing harm or achieving benefits" [2].

These benefits aren't just for Muslims; they're for the whole world, as the Quran says: "And We have not sent you, [O Muhammad], except as a mercy to the worlds" (Al-Anbiya: 107). This message is a universal mercy for all of creation. That's why the core of Islamic law is built on the principle: "There should be no harm or reciprocating harm" [3]. It's about removing harm and bringing good wherever it's found, as long as it aligns with the texts and goals of the faith.

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 The Proven Losses

Here are the most prominent outcomes of those events:

 First: The Harm of Breaking the Covenant of Trust

A covenant of trust is one that a Muslim honours towards those who have granted them security. The Quran says: "And if any of the polytheists seek your protection, then grant him protection so that he may hear the words of Allah, and then deliver him to his place of safety" (At-Tawbah: 6). This also applies to someone a Muslim is living with. The Prophet (peace be upon him) said: "The humblest among them may grant protection on behalf of all the Muslims, and the farthest may grant protection on behalf of all the Muslims" [4]. Ibn Qudamah said: "If a non-believer enters the land of Islam under a covenant of trust, it is not permissible to harm him under any circumstances. Likewise, if a Muslim enters their land under a covenant of trust, it is not permissible for him to betray them" [5].

This covenant prevents a Muslim from causing any harm, even in a "land of war" or a "land of disbelief." These terms, in Islamic political thought, refer to a host foreign country. It's a given that the historical Islamic state was founded on this principle.

The problem that emerged was the use of forced justifications to break Islamic law, which requires a Muslim to maintain peace in an enemy's land, just as it demands the enemy honour that peace if they enter Muslim land legally and without war. On this basis, a visa to enter a country is considered a universally accepted covenant of trust among scholars. The greatest loss from the 9/11 attacks was the betrayal of this covenant and the circumvention of Sharia. This is separate from good intentions; a Muslim can't steal to give charity. A legitimate goal requires legitimate means, and the ends don't justify the means—they're defined by them. The biggest loss was losing the legitimacy of the act in the eyes of God.

The Prophet (peace be upon him) said: "Whoever introduces into this matter of ours what is not from it, will have it rejected" [6]. As Imam al-Shatibi said: "The means to achieve goals take the same ruling as their goals. If the goals are permissible, the means must be as well" [7].

 Second: The Harm of Breaking Pacts

Al-Qaeda didn't have its own state or land; they were guests in a new Muslim state (Taliban-ruled Afghanistan). They were obligated by both Islamic law and good manners not to defy the state's orders or harm it in any way. Their leader was bound by a vow (allegiance) to the leader of that state to listen and obey. Ayman al-Zawahiri confirmed this in his allegiance to Akhtar Mansour in 2015, saying: "I renew my allegiance to you... on the path of our Shaykh Osama bin Laden and his martyred brothers in their allegiance to Mullah Omar." This proves that Bin Laden was sworn to Mullah Omar, as also mentioned by Abu Musab al-Suri in his book "The Call to Global Islamic Resistance." Although some academic studies, like Anne Stenersen's *Al-Qaida in Afghanistan* and a paper from the Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, highlight disagreements over the nature and limits of this allegiance, they all agree that Al-Qaeda acknowledged Mullah Omar's authority within Afghanistan [8].

The 9/11 attacks were not ordered or planned by the Taliban; they were carried out under a betrayal of trust. The attackers assumed the Taliban would abide by their state's laws, but their betrayal of this pact and the state's legitimate law led to a war that cost Afghanistan 20 years and thousands of lives, all due to an act that was militarily and religiously ill-conceived. How can they be happy about two towers falling and a few thousand of their enemy's lives lost, when they forget about a state falling and hundreds of thousands of lives lost because of a betrayed pact? Allah says: "O you who have believed, fulfil [all] contracts" (Al-Ma'idah: 1).

The Prophet (peace be upon him) said: "Muslims are bound by their conditions, except for a condition that makes a lawful thing unlawful, or a lawful thing unlawful" [9]. He also said: "There are four characteristics which, if found in a person, make him a complete hypocrite; and if he has one of them, he has a characteristic of hypocrisy until he gives it up: when he speaks, he lies; when he makes a promise, he breaks it; when he makes a pact, he betrays it; and when he argues, he transgresses" [10]. Scholars agree that betrayal and breaking a pact are major sins. Al-Nawawi said: "Scholars are unanimous on the obligation of fulfilling pacts with non-believers if they are made in a proper manner, and it is forbidden to break them without a legitimate religious reason" [11]. What then of pacts with believers?!

 Third: Was Legitimate Jihad Achieved?

Scholars made capability a condition for "offensive jihad" (seeking out an enemy) but not for "defensive jihad" (defending against an attacker). Ibn Qudamah said: "Defensive jihad does not require any conditions, as it is a necessary fight and a defence against an aggressor; everyone participates in it with whatever they can" [12].

Ignoring that Al-Qaeda does not represent jihad in Islam—it's not a state, and its leader isn't an Imam who people fight behind—how could it launch an "offensive jihad" against an enemy it couldn't repel or stop from expanding its control into Muslim lands like Afghanistan and Iraq? Allah says: "So fear Allah as much as you are able" (At-Taghabun: 16). And the Prophet (peace be upon him) said: "If I command you to do something, then do of it as much as you are able" [13].

Ibn Taymiyyah stressed that capability is a fundamental condition that can't be ignored. He said: "Jihad is not obligatory except with ability and capability. If capability is absent, the obligation falls, and the harm of proceeding is greater than its benefit" [14]. This perfectly describes Al-Qaeda's situation: they had no ability to fight the US on its home soil, nor could they inflict a significant military blow or achieve a real benefit for the Muslim community. In fact, their actions had the opposite effect, increasing the enemy's influence and control over Muslim lands. What benefit was there in an offensive jihad that brought no victory and no gains, but only disaster for the entire Muslim community?

 Fourth: The Distortion of Islam's Image

The September 11th attacks were a golden opportunity to distort the image of Islam, creating the stereotype that every Muslim is a crazy suicide bomber who could kill those around him at any moment. Some might be deceived by statistics showing an increase in the number of Muslims after 9/11 or the sale of more Qurans, but they know that this increase was already happening steadily before the attacks. The real issue isn't how many people converted, but how many were alienated and turned against Islam. The image of trial was now linked to "legitimate jihad," not the questionable kind. That's why Allah says: "And We will surely test you until We make evident those who strive among you and [make evident] the patient, and We will test your affairs" (Muhammad: 31).

Official FBI reports show that **hate crimes against Muslims in the US jumped from 28 cases in 2000 to 481 in 2001, a 1617% increase** [15]. This statistic reveals an unprecedented surge in hostility towards Muslims after September. A 2021 Pew Research Center poll showed that nearly half of all Americans still associate Islam with violence two decades after the attacks [16]. In contrast, studies like Lori Peek's *Behind the Backlash* showed that some individuals in the West converted to Islam as a reaction to the wave of Islamophobia, but these cases remain a limited exception compared to the overwhelming trend of aversion and hostility towards Islam [17].

 Fifth: The Loss of Charitable Work

Allah ordered us to do good deeds, saying: "And do good" (Al-Hajj: 77). This command was hampered and lost due to an impulsive act and an unprecedented audacity towards religious law by a group who thought they were reforming but were actually corrupting. As a result, charitable organisations suffered, they were squeezed, and their assets were seized. The accusation of "terrorism" became a ready-made label used even by rival regimes. This was seen during the blockade of Qatar by countries whose people are also Muslim. The September 11th attacks added a new, more effective weapon to the arsenal used against Muslims, a weapon that wouldn't have been so powerful without those events.

This led to the official closure and freezing of assets of several major Islamic charities by US government decisions, such as the Holy Land Foundation for Relief and Development, whose assets were frozen on December 4, 2001, by a US Treasury statement, as well as the Global Relief Foundation and the Benevolence International Foundation, which were also targeted in December 2001 and November 2002, respectively [18]. These events are all documented in US Treasury (OFAC) and FBI reports after 9/11.

 Sixth: Systematic Repression

The systematic repression used by collaborator regimes intensified and was supported after 9/11. Instead of Al-Qaeda's strategy of focusing on the "far enemy," these regimes were given the perfect excuse to repress the "near enemy," expanding their security control under the banner of "counter-terrorism."

A 2003 Human Rights Watch report confirmed that **many Arab governments used counter-terrorism laws after 9/11 to justify arresting thousands of Islamist opponents and expanding the authority of security agencies beyond the judiciary** [19]. This represented an unprecedented "international legitimisation" of dictatorships. An Amnesty International report from 2002 also noted that several countries in the Middle East and North Africa used the 9/11 events as a cover to classify Islamic reform movements as a security threat, thereby cracking down on them and arresting their leaders [20].

 Seventh: The Audacity of Regimes

A lingering problem is the audacity of dictatorial regimes to suppress Islamic reformist movements under the pretext that they hold Al-Qaeda's ideology, gaining an international legitimacy they could only have dreamed of. Even the Tablighi Jamaat (a peaceful missionary group) was labelled as a terrorist organisation in some countries, and its leaders, like Shaykh Al-Asir in Lebanon, were arrested, even though their ideology is a world away from Al-Qaeda's.

A Russian Supreme Court ruling on May 7, 2009, documented the **ban of the Tablighi Jamaat as an "extremist organisation,"** an example of how the definition of "terrorism" was expanded to include peaceful missionary groups in some countries [21]. A 2005 Human Rights Watch report on Lebanon also mentioned that authorities exploited the post-9/11 climate to justify arbitrary arrests of Islamic preachers and figures under the guise of being linked to extremism, without providing sufficient judicial evidence [22].

 Eighth: Draining the Fountains

After September 11th, the strategy of "draining the fountains" was put in place. This helped to stifle even the academic movement, and created rival movements like the Madkhalis who are directly connected to intelligence agencies. This would never have succeeded or spread without the 9/11 events.

A 2003 report by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace titled *Islam, Terrorism and the United States* documented that US pressure after 9/11 pushed many Arab and Muslim regimes to adopt a "draining the fountains" policy, which was used to crack down on educational, religious, and charitable institutions [23]. A 2004 RAND Institute study, *Civil Democratic Islam*, also noted that this policy encouraged the strengthening of religious groups tied to official regimes in opposition to independent reformist movements. This explains the rise of the Madkhalis and other groups linked to security agencies after 9/11 [24].

 Ninth: The Destructive Mindset

The emergence of Al-Qaeda was undoubtedly a reflection of a contemporary movement's strong ability to destroy but its lack of a constructive mindset. Destruction is a thousand times easier and faster than building. Instead of directing their strength and support towards the Taliban state, they destroyed it. Instead of delving into the technological and scientific specialisations that would benefit the community, they sacrificed their qualified members in suicide operations under a hazy pretence of legitimacy and achieving some noteworthy change. This brings to mind the story of a scientifically brilliant young man in communications who joined ISIS. His first assignment was a suicide mission. It was a moment of truth for him; he realised that if they truly wanted reform, they would have used his skills, not sought to get rid of him. Perhaps this is what the new Taliban state and the "new Syria" have realised: that patient construction is better than easy destruction.

Robert Pape, in his book *Cutting the Fuse: The Explosion of Global Suicide Terrorism* (2010), confirmed that **suicide groups tend to waste their human resources in unequal operations instead of investing them in building sustainable institutions**, making their long-term impact more destructive than reformist [25]. A 2016 UN report on counter-terrorism also showed that the increase in suicide operations weakened the organisational capabilities of jihadist movements and led to the loss of specialised personnel who could have contributed to construction and development if their efforts had been directed differently [26].

 Tenth: The Continuing Splintering

The ideas of Al-Qaeda and the subsequent splintering and division that followed September 11th gave birth to ISIS. And what do you know about ISIS? A sick ideology, a sterile approach, and a bad legacy that led to sons fighting fathers. The Muslim community's fields saw minds being manipulated by the myth of a caliph and a flawed ideology. Soon, the dust cleared, and everyone realised they hadn't even ridden a donkey. ISIS wouldn't have existed without the ideological groundwork and extremism adopted by Al-Qaeda. Muslim countries like the new Taliban state and the new Syria still suffer from their takfir (excommunication) and sick approach, making everyone realise that the "gain" of September was just a massive loss that benefited a bunch of thieves.

A UN Security Council report (S/2014/815, 14 November 2014) confirmed that **ISIS was a direct extension of Al-Qaeda's networks in Iraq led by Zarqawi**, and that the extremist ideology that emerged within Al-Qaeda paved the way for the birth of an even more extreme organisation [27]. The researcher Aaron Y. Zelin, in his paper *The Islamic State vs. al-Qaeda: Strategic Dimensions of a Prolonged Conflict* (2016), showed that the conflict between Al-Qaeda and ISIS was merely a struggle within the same ideological family, and the split wouldn't have happened without the environment created by Al-Qaeda's rhetoric after September [28].

 Eleventh: The Militant Media

Following and before the September 11th attacks, the theory of "militant media" was adopted. The al-Sahab media network emerged, followed by the media networks of ISIS. There's no doubt they succeeded in reaching a large segment of the Muslim youth, who were influenced and thought it was a gain. But in reality, this "gain" benefited the propaganda networks against Islam, providing a documented picture of Muslims at war. Everyone forgot that if it were a real gain, it wouldn't have been allowed to circulate on the American internet, while people were being secretly slaughtered in places like Uyghur, Burma, and Iraq, and in the slaughterhouses of regimes and their prisons. They deluded themselves with a fake victory from a hollow media that boasted about a meaningless event here or there, while no single professional media organisation belonging to an Islamic movement remained that could produce media beneficial to the Muslim community.

A 2015 Brookings Institution report, *The ISIS Twitter Census*, showed that **ISIS widely exploited Twitter to spread its propaganda and reach tens of thousands of followers, but this same material provided ready-made content for security agencies and Western media to fuel a negative image of Islam** [29]. UN counter-terrorism reports from 2017 also confirmed that the propaganda of extremist groups online contributed to feeding a global discourse of hate against Muslims and intensified Islamophobia [30].

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 Did Al-Qaeda's Leaders Back Down?

One thing that isn't discussed or debated is whether Al-Qaeda's leaders backed down and realised their religious mistake. Maybe they did, otherwise why would Bin Laden have offered a truce to Europe and America? His call wasn't highlighted because he didn't have a seat at the negotiating table and couldn't even protect himself; the alleged power of his organisation was well known, and in fact, its existence was essential to justify colonial policies. On April 15, 2004, Al Jazeera broadcast an audio recording attributed to Osama bin Laden in which he offered a three-month truce to Europeans on the condition that they withdraw their forces from Muslim countries, an offer that was later rejected by European governments [31].

It didn't stop there. Even al-Zawahiri, after the Arab Spring, called on the people of Egypt to stand with the elected president Morsi and his group, forgetting his scathing criticism of their methods in his book *The Bitter Harvest* and his total rejection of participating in a political process. In August 2013, al-Zawahiri released an audio recording titled "Victory for Islam" in which he condemned the ousting of President Mohamed Morsi, describing it as an American-military conspiracy, and confirmed his support for what he called "legitimacy." This was a shift from his old rhetoric in *The Bitter Harvest* (1991), where he attacked the Muslim Brotherhood and rejected their political approach [32].

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 In Conclusion: The True Gains

The real gain is a true awareness of the contemporary Islamic movement's superficiality in dealing with oppression, which turns it from the oppressed into the oppressor and gives a reason for its own annihilation. It also highlights its lack of constructive strategies and flexible political action, and its shortage of qualified personnel. How many groups have been led to their destruction by an ignorant supported by a power? ISIS isn't far from that.

And it's for everyone to realise that they lack a balanced view of their historical adversaries. There's a story about Amr ibn al-Aas, who said: I heard the Messenger of Allah (peace be upon him) say: "The Hour will not be established until the Romans are the most numerous of people." Amr asked him: "Is what you say going to happen?" He said: "I am only saying what I heard from the Messenger of Allah." He said: "If you say that, then there are four qualities among them: they are the most forbearing of people during a trial, the quickest to recover after a disaster, the most likely to return after a defeat, and the best of them towards a destitute, an orphan, and the weak. And a fifth one is good and beautiful, they are the most preventative of the tyranny of kings" [33].

Here is Amr ibn al-Aas, who fought the Romans, acknowledging their virtues and admitting they had noble qualities that Islam recognises, not rejects, just because they are opponents. But they are doing the opposite. They are erasing the virtues of the countries that sheltered their displaced and protected their oppressed. They are doing the opposite of what they pledged in terms of safety and security in those lands. They are doing things that terrify their own people, without considering the consequences of treachery and betrayal, and the image of a religion that has been completely distorted, all without any religious or worldly benefit.

There remains one final gain, and that is how to get out of the wilderness of absolute surrender to any superficial idea, how to understand the consequences of actions, and how to go beyond manufactured justifications after the fact. The principle is to investigate the legitimacy of an action before doing it and to consider its harms before its benefits. Jurisprudence is not just about knowing what's allowed and what's forbidden, but about knowing the lesser of two evils and the lighter of two harms. Imam Ibn Taymiyyah clarified this, saying: "If benefits and harms, or good deeds and bad deeds, are in conflict, the greater of them must be given precedence. Whenever an action has a benefit that outweighs its harm, it is given precedence. And whenever its harm outweighs its benefit, it should be abandoned" [34]. As al-Izz ibn Abd al-Salam said: "All of Sharia is about benefits, either preventing harms or achieving benefits" [35].

The time has come to truly understand the gains of September 11th, and to realise that it was a crime against Islam, Muslims, and the whole world.

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 Documentation and References

[1] Al-Shatibi, Ibrahim ibn Musa al-Lakhmi. Al-Muwafaqat fi Usul al-Shari'a. Edited by Abdullah Daraz. 2nd ed. Beirut: Dar al-Ma'rifah, 1395 AH - 1975 CE. (2/8).

[2] Al-Izz ibn Abd al-Salam, Abdul Aziz ibn Abd al-Salam. *Qawa'id al-Ahkam fi Masalih al-Anam*. Edited by Mahmoud Shakir. 1st ed. Damascus: Matba'at al-Sa'adah, 1991 CE. (1/5).

[3] Ibn Majah, Muhammad ibn Yazid al-Qazwini. Sunan Ibn Majah. Edited by Shu'aib al-Arna'ut et al. 1st ed. Beirut: Dar al-Risalah al-Alamiya, 1430 AH - 2009 CE. (Kitab al-Ahkam, Bab Man Bana fi Haqqihi ma Yadurru bi-Jarihi, Hadith No. 2341).

[4] Abu Dawud al-Sijistani, Sulayman ibn al-Ash'ath. Sunan Abi Dawud. Edited by Shu'aib al-Arna'ut and Muhammad Kamil Qarah Balli. 1st ed. Beirut: Dar al-Risalah al-Alamiya, 1430 AH - 2009 CE. (Kitab al-Jihad, Bab fi Adnahum Yujir 'ala al-Muslimeen, Hadith No. 2758). And Al-Nasa'i, Ahmad ibn Shu'aib. Al-Mujtaba min al-Sunan (Sunan al-Nasa'i). Edited by Hasan Abdul Mun'im Shalabi. 1st ed. Beirut: Mu'assasat al-Risalah, 1430 AH - 2009 CE. (Kitab al-Jihad, Bab Jawaz Jiwar al-Mar'ah, Hadith No. 4749).

[5] Ibn Qudamah al-Maqdisi, Abdullah ibn Ahmad. Al-Mughni. 1st ed. Beirut: Dar Ihya' al-Turath al-Arabi, 1405 AH. (9/237).

[6] Al-Bukhari, Muhammad ibn Isma'il. *Sahih al-Bukhari. Edited by Muhammad Zuhair ibn Nasir al-Nasir. 1st ed. Beirut: Dar Tawq al-Najat, 1422 AH. (Kitab al-Sulh, Bab Idha Istalahu 'ala Sulhin Jawrin fa al-Sulhu Mardud, Hadith No. 2697). Muslim ibn al-Hajjaj al-Naysaburi. Sahih Muslim*. Edited by Muhammad Fu'ad Abd al-Baqi. Beirut: Dar Ihya' al-Turath al-Arabi. (Kitab al-Aqdiyah, Bab Naqd al-Ahkam al-Batilah wa Radd Muhdathat al-Umur, Hadith No. 1718).

[7] Al-Shatibi. Al-Muwafaqat fi Usul al-Shari'a   (2/294).

[8] Stenersen, Anne. Al-Qaida in Afghanistan. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017. And Lahoud, Nelly, et al.Letters from Abbottabad: Bin Ladin Sidelined? Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, 3 May 2012.

[9] Al-Tirmidhi, Muhammad ibn Isa. Sunan al-Tirmidhi (Al-Jami' al-Kabir). Edited by Shu'aib al-Arna'ut et al. 1st ed. Beirut: Dar al-Risalah al-Alamiya, 1434 AH - 2013 CE. (Kitab al-Ahkam, Bab Ma Ja'a fi Injazi al-Wa'd, Hadith No. 1352). And Abu Dawud al-Sijistani. *Sunan Abi Dawud*. (Kitab al-Ahkam, Bab fi al-Rajul Yastaghfilu fi al-Bay' wa al-'Itq wa al-Nikah, Hadith No. 3594).

[10] Al-Bukhari, Muhammad ibn Isma'il. Sahih al-Bukhari. (Kitab al-Iman, Bab Khisal al-Munafiq, Hadith No. 34). And Muslim ibn al-Hajjaj al-Naysaburi. Sahih Muslim. (Kitab al-Iman, Bab Bayan Khisal al-Munafiq, Hadith No. 58).

[11] Al-Nawawi, Yahya ibn Sharaf. Sharh Sahih Muslim. 2nd ed. Beirut: Dar Ihya' al-Turath al-Arabi, 1392 AH. (12/259).

[12] Ibn Qudamah al-Maqdisi. Al-Mughni. (9/202).

[13] Al-Bukhari, Muhammad ibn Isma'il. Sahih al-Bukhari. (Kitab al-I'tisam bi al-Kitab wa al-Sunnah, Bab al-Iqtida' bi Sunan Rasul Allah sallallahu 'alayhi wa sallam, Hadith No. 7288). And Muslim ibn al-Hajjaj al-Naysaburi. Sahih Muslim. (Kitab al-Hajj, Bab Fard al-Hajj Marratan fi al-'Umr, Hadith No. 1337).

[14] Ibn Taymiyyah, Ahmad Abdul Halim.Majmu' Fatawa Shaykh al-Islam Ahmad ibn Taymiyyah. Compiled and arranged by Abdul Rahman ibn Qasim. 1st ed. Medina: King Fahd Complex for the Printing of the Holy Quran, 1416 AH - 1995 CE. (28/358).

[15] U.S. Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation. Hate Crime Statistics, 2000. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2001. And Hate Crime Statistics, 2001. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2002.

[16] Pew Research Center. "Two Decades After 9/11, Americans' Views of Muslims are More Negative." Washington, D.C.: Pew Research Center, September 9, 2021.

[17] Peek, Lori. Behind the Backlash: Muslim Americans after 9/11. Temple University Press, 2011.

[18] U.S. Department of the Treasury, Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC). "Treasury Department Statement Regarding Holy Land Foundation for Relief and Development." Press Release, December 4, 2001. And additional reports from the FBI and OFAC regarding the freezing of assets of the Global Relief Foundation and Benevolence International Foundation.

[19] Human Rights Watch. "The War on Terrorism and Human Rights." World Report 2003. New York: Human Rights Watch, 2003.

[20] Amnesty International. "Counter-Terrorism and Human Rights." Annual Report 2002. London: Amnesty International, 2002.

[21] Ruling of the Russian Supreme Court on May 7, 2009, banning the Tablighi Jamaat as an "extremist organisation."

[22] Amnesty International. Report 2005 – Lebanon. And Human Rights Watch. World Report 2005 (Lebanon section).

[23] Ottaway, Marina, et al. "Islam, Terrorism and the United States." Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Middle East Center, 2003.

[24] Benard, Cheryl. Civil Democratic Islam: Partners, Resources, and Strategies. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2004.

[25] Pape, Robert A., and James K. Feldman. Cutting the Fuse: The Explosion of Global Suicide Terrorism and How to Stop It. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2010.

[26] United Nations Security Council. Report of the Secretary-General on the threat posed by ISIL (Da'esh) to international peace and security.... S/2016/501, 9 June 2016.

[27] United Nations Security Council. Report of the Secretary-General on the threat posed by ISIL (Da'esh) to international peace and security.... S/2014/815, 14 November 2014.

[28] Zelin, Aaron Y. "The Islamic State vs. al-Qaeda: Strategic Dimensions of a Prolonged Conflict." The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Policy Notes, No. 33, February 2016.

[29] Berger, J.M., and Jonathon Morgan. "The ISIS Twitter Census: Defining and Describing the Population of ISIS Supporters on Twitter." The Brookings Institution, March 2015.

[30] United Nations Security Council. Report of the Secretary-General on the threat posed by ISIL (Da'esh). S/2017/573, 7 August 2017.

[31] Al Jazeera. "Audio Recording Attributed to Osama bin Laden Offers Truce with Europe." News report, April 15, 2004.

[32] Al-Zawahiri, Ayman. Audio recording: "Victory for Islam." August 2013. And *The Bitter Harvest: The Muslim Brotherhood in Sixty Years*. Undated, 1991.

[33] Muslim ibn al-Hajjaj al-Naysaburi. Sahih Muslim. (Kitab al-Fitan wa Ashrat al-Sa'ah, Bab La Taqoom al-Sa'ah Hatta Yakun al-Rum Akthar al-Nas, Hadith No. 2898).

[34] Ibn Taymiyyah, Ahmad Abdul Halim. Majmu' Fatawa Shaykh al-Islam Ahmad ibn Taymiyyah. (20/48).

[35] Al-Izz ibn Abd al-Salam, Abdul Aziz ibn Abd al-Salam. Qawa'id al-Ahkam fi Masalih al-Anam. (1/11).