Is Reconciliation Between the Egyptian Regime and the Brotherhood Impossible?

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No reconciliation. Don't betray the covenant in the name of tolerance. Have you forgotten the blood? Can life be pleasant after those massacres? No reconciliation.

This isn't a poem; it's the cry of an entire current that has tasted the bitterness of killing, betrayal, displacement, imprisonment, pursuit, lies, and slander. It was imperative to present its viewpoint on reconciliation between the Brotherhood and the regime. The word "Egyptian" may have been omitted because those who hold this view refuse to call a regime more Zionist than the Zionists "Egyptian." So, when we ask: is reconciliation between the regime and the Brotherhood impossible? The answer, supported by successive arguments, is a firm "Yes, absolutely." The most prominent of these justifications is the scale of the catastrophe that unfolded in the wake of the coup.

The army, led by Sisi, didn't just betray its elected president; it committed dozens of massacres across Egypt. The largest of these—by the regime's own admission—were the massacres of Rab'a, al-Nahda, Ramses in Cairo, and Al-Qaed Ibrahim in Alexandria. Since the July 2013 coup, blood has flowed like rivers. Human Rights Watch documented that the dispersal of the Rab'a and al-Nahda sit-ins on August 14, 2013, was characterised by excessive violence using armoured vehicles and live ammunition, resulting in hundreds of deaths. The organisation estimated the death toll at Rab'a alone was no less than 817, and that this violence may amount to crimes against humanity [1].

These are not just cold numbers, but human stories of families erased from public life. Furthermore, tens of thousands have been imprisoned and tortured. Amnesty International documented that after 2013, Egypt became an "open-air prison" for the regime's opponents [2]. According to independent human rights estimates, the number of detainees exceeded 120,000 over the past decade [3].

The courts were another tool of repression, issuing hundreds of mass death sentences described by the UN as a "dangerous precedent and a flagrant miscarriage of justice" and a "mockery of justice" [4].

The regime didn't stop at arresting activists and leaders; it expanded the circle to include the families of opponents, then sympathisers, and even those accused by the media of "sympathising with sympathisers." This "circle of injustice" became an official policy, targeting the root, not just the individual. Entire families were wiped out through killing, imprisonment, and forced displacement abroad. The repression even extended to pursuing opponents overseas with arbitrary military sentences, revoking their citizenship, and denying them official documents [5].

This immense, unjustifiable level of oppression created a deep social rift and an enmity towards the regime that cannot be healed. This unique and ongoing form of repression makes the very idea of reconciliation impossible to propose, and anyone who does is seen as delusional by these victims.

The scale of killing, imprisonment, and displacement has created a social chasm that cannot be fixed by a word like "tolerance" tossed out at a conference or a media deal. Someone who has lost their home, family, and country will not be convinced that "reconciliation" is enough to erase the memory of graves, prisons, and exiles.

The Brotherhood considers the current regime to be "tyrannical aggressors" (Bugha), and the confrontation with them is a matter of defending against an aggressor, as jurists have decreed that Muslims must repel those who attack them, even if they are Muslim, based on the Prophet's saying: "Whoever is killed defending his wealth is a martyr, and whoever is killed defending his blood is a martyr" [6].

This doctrinal view, adopted in the group's literature, differs from that of jihadi groups who have described the regime and the army as a "renegade group" (ta'ifa mumtani'a) from the rituals of Islam and apostates who must be fought [7].

Despite not excluding the regime from the fold of Islam, the Brotherhood still sees it as an aggressor that must cease its hostility and submit to the rule of God. Therefore, there can be no reconciliation without a just retribution for those who killed thousands of people, foremost among them Sisi, whom they consider a traitor to his elected president and the leaders of the massacres who orchestrated the mass killings.

While some Salafis have proposed initiatives to close the chapter of bloodshed through blood money (diyah) for both sides, the Brotherhood does not recognise this as a valid religious solution in this case. The members of the regime who were killed, despite their scarcity, are not treated as innocents but as traitors to whom the rule of an aggressor applies, meaning they are not due any blood money. Ibn Qudamah says in Al-Mughni: "If a man enters a house intending to kill or steal from people, and they defend themselves and kill him, they are not liable" [8].

Accordingly, the doctrinal position within the group remains closed to any superficial reconciliation, as they cannot justify it to their followers without a just retribution or genuine trials, which makes impossibility a more likely outcome than possibility.

Furthermore, a current has emerged within the Brotherhood — and among some of their external religious authorities — that considers the regime to be an apostate (murtad) from a religious standpoint. This current doesn't speak in purely political terms; it uses the language of doctrinal rulings. From their perspective, the regime is a "tyrant" (Baghi) that has betrayed its trust and attacked the lives of Muslims. Sisi himself has repeatedly stated that he intervened to prevent the rule of an Islamic group, and this is read by these individuals as material evidence of a departure from the group's objectives and the goal of religious empowerment for which it was founded [9].

The result is a difference between the official, traditional discourse of the Brotherhood (which calls the regime "tyrannical" and demands an end to the aggression) and the discourse of another current within the broader community that uses a more precise religious ruling: apostasy. The former justifies resistance based on repelling an aggressor, while the latter goes so far as to declare the regime's rule religiously illegitimate [10], a doctrinal leap that effectively blocks any reconciliation formula that accepts the regime's continued existence. Some leaders of the group in prison or exile have expressed an outright rejection of any "alliance" with a man whom their leaders have publicly described as a "tyrant" or "occupier" of the Islamic political sphere, which makes the term "reconciliation" seem like a betrayal of the blood and the cause to a broad base of followers [11].

I am not downplaying the existence of currents within the group that are more inclined towards a settlement or political manoeuvring, but the doctrinal reality that has been entrenched since 2013 — that some read the coup and the bloodshed as a departure from the religion of governance — makes the acceptance of reconciliation nearly impossible for a significant segment of the grassroots and religious authorities. It is in this doctrinal divergence that a large part of the impossibility of reconciliation lies: because a truce between two parties, one of whom is considered doctrinally/religiously a "renegade," cannot be merely a political agreement, nor can the word "reconciliation" erase this deeply rooted religious authority.

Politically, the regime has succeeded in cementing its grip on the state and controlling its institutions with all forms of repressive methods, so much so that the landscape appears to have been completely reshaped to its liking. Sisi didn't just rely on force; he crafted a repetitive, demonising discourse, labelling the Brotherhood as "the people of evil" and stating in public remarks that they "don't deserve sympathy" [12]. This discourse makes any talk of reconciliation seem like an illusion because opening up the files of killings and arrests would mean an official admission of crimes committed and personal responsibility for them.

The security crackdown wasn't an isolated event but became a policy. Official and international estimates speak of 20–60 thousand political prisoners [13], but Egyptian opposition estimates confirm that the real number has exceeded 160,000 detainees, including those sentenced, in pre-trial detention, and forcibly disappeared. These aren't just numbers; they are stories of entire families ground down: a father in prison, a mother on the run, children denied education or travel. The machinery of repression didn't stop at the political figure but extended to their family, then to their sympathisers, and then to the sympathisers of sympathisers, becoming a whirlpool with no bottom.

The scene is a repeat: anyone labelled an opponent finds themselves in an endless cycle of imprisonment, denial of official documents, and revocation of citizenship abroad [14]. Human rights activists have described the torture and ill-treatment in prisons as amounting to crimes against humanity [15].

In foreign policy, the regime played the interests card; even countries that initially described the coup as bloody, like Turkey and Qatar, have since normalised relations and closed the Brotherhood file in favour of economic and strategic projects [16].

As for the Brotherhood, due to the repression, they are like someone asked to cross a bridge before they can even get to it. They lack tools, specialised administrative expertise, and accurate information about what's happening internally. The result is that they have become like a blind person lost in the desert without a guide.

So, with a regime that demonises and represses and fears admitting guilt on one side, and an exhausted and shackled group without tools on the other, talking about reconciliation becomes futile. Politics for both sides has turned into a closed, zero-sum game, with the only outcome being the continuation of the break and the conflict.

Egypt has become a ticking economic time bomb that could explode at any moment. The external debt has multiplied dozens of times, exceeding $165 billion in 2024, compared to only about $43 billion in 2013, according to World Bank and IMF data [17]. With the debt, the budget deficit has ballooned, and the regime has rushed to sell off state assets, from the two islands of Tiran and Sanafir to the Ras al-Hikma deal, and the sale of strategic and vital sectors to other countries.

To make matters worse, gas deals with Israel were formulated with some of the weakest conditions in the world, turning Egypt from a producing country into a gas importer with burdensome terms [18]. Amid this decline, inflation has continued to rise, capital has fled abroad, and confidence in the local market has collapsed.

Corruption didn't stop at deals; it extended to the smuggling of antiquities: 160,000 archaeological pieces were seized in an Italian port, having left Egypt in a diplomatic container linked to the Ministry of Defence [19]. Reports also spoke of planes loaded with gold being shipped abroad in mysterious circumstances, reflecting the scale of financial chaos and smuggling. In contrast, the regime has continued its extravagance: building lavish presidential palaces, a new administrative capital, and train lines serving businessmen, while citizens live in increasing poverty.

This economic collapse, built on a systematic network of corruption, makes the Brotherhood's return to the scene through reconciliation practically impossible. The regime needs them to be away from the economy to blame them for its failures and present them as a scapegoat to public opinion. As for the Brotherhood, entering into a "reform partnership" with this corruption would be a reputational suicide. The group built its social capital on integrity and transparency, something that even state bodies have acknowledged. The Central Auditing Organisation stated that the late President Mohamed Morsi did not take a salary or any financial benefits throughout his nearly one year in office [20].

Thus, the regime will not accept the Brotherhood's return to an economic scene that would expose its corruption, and the Brotherhood will not accept being a front for whitewashing this systematic failure. Therefore, the economic file becomes a decisive factor in the impossibility of any truce, as it would be a truce with a comprehensive system of corruption, not with a normal state.

The military coup authority has left no stone unturned in the social fabric of Egypt. The class gap has widened, and the middle class, which was the safety valve for any society, has eroded. Poverty rates have risen to officially exceed 30% [21], while other estimates suggest that more than 90% of Egyptians live on the edge of poverty, with a lack of services and high prices [22].

In contrast, isolated compound communities have emerged on the surface, where the wealthy "Egyptians" live, separated from the poor "Egyptians." This new class of businessmen and interest networks will not accept the Brotherhood's return to the social scene, as their presence means re-empowering the revolutionary middle class, which threatens the privileges and status of the wealthy in the social hierarchy.

The authority itself has transformed into a closed class, consisting of the army, police, judiciary, and their bureaucratic arms. It is now presented as the class of "masters," in contrast to the rest of the people who are treated as "slaves." In light of this reality, it is impossible for the regime to accept the return of a popular reformist group like the Brotherhood; their mere existence reminds people of the idea of social justice and threatens the engineering of the new "class society."

As for the Brotherhood themselves, they will not accept being a supporter of social crimes deliberately committed against the people as punishment for their revolution against injustice. The group's return to the scene amidst this social collapse would make it a partner in a system that has nothing to do with reform, which contradicts its historical and advocacy project.

It is also ethically appropriate to acknowledge that the Brotherhood does not represent the revolutionary forces alone, even if they are the largest faction. There are opposing Salafis, and there are leftists and liberals, in addition to a wide segment of the people with no ideology. Although some of these forces made the mistake of siding with the coup at its beginning, the return of the Brotherhood today will be considered a betrayal of the revolution by many of them, especially among the non-ideological popular current, which is the most numerous.

Thus, the social scene does not provide an environment for any reconciliation: a condescending class authority, the wealthy fortified in their compounds, the poor crushed and becoming more miserable every day, and revolutionary forces that see any return of the Brotherhood in this situation as nothing more than legitimising classism and injustice.

The mouthpieces of the fourth estate have spread volumes of lies and distortions against opponents at home and abroad, foremost among them the Brotherhood. The official and pro-regime private media have crafted a unified narrative through drama, programs, and news, so much so that dramatic works have been turned into fake documentaries that rewrite history from the perspective of the coup. The series "Al-Ikhtiyar" and others like it were not art, but systematic propaganda to entrench the security state's narrative and justify the massacres and arrests.

The matter was not limited to the media; religious institutions were also implicated to give this narrative legitimacy. Dar al-Iftaa, which was placed under the authority of the presidency by a presidential decree, transformed from a comprehensive religious authority into a political tool that accuses opponents of treason and implicitly brands them as apostates through official statements and politicised fatwas. Thus, the religious and media authorities became allied in producing a single discourse based on demonising opponents and criminalising any attempt to talk about reconciliation or transitional justice.

And such a system will not accept, after all this narrative accumulation, to back down or even be silent about the weakest ideas for reconciliation. A large part of this narrative is not just local; it is supported by external forces that do not want the Brotherhood to return, even socially, as they are a popular force that threatens the projects of false stability in the region.

On the other hand, the opposition media abroad, along with the Brotherhood's media, will not accept the falsification of history or the effacement of the victims' blood. The group itself, even if it wanted to, would not be able to prevent its media and followers from reminding people of the massacres, prisons, and forced disappearances. In this case, the media acts as an insulating wall that prevents any rapprochement, as both parties are determined to cling to radically contradictory narratives.

Thus, any political or social reconciliation hits the wall of the media: a regime that has created a narrative based on blood and demonisation, and an opposition that sees silence as a betrayal of history and the martyrs. Without a media that prepares the ground, any reconciliation is practically impossible.

The impossibility of reconciliation is no longer just an internal matter; influential international powers also represent a solid wall that prevents even the thought of it. Some regional powers, foremost among them the UAE, Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait, spent tens of billions to support the military coup in 2013 and ensure the stability of the new regime away from any return of the Brotherhood. The value of Gulf support for Egypt after 2013 was estimated at over $100 billion in deposits, oil grants, and direct investments, which was as much political as it was economic support [23]. This influence made the Egyptian regime a hostage to these powers, unable to make a strategic decision like reconciliation even if it wanted to.

In addition, the United States, which historically dealt with the Brotherhood as a social and political force, re-evaluated its position after 2013 and tended to consider the group a threat to the stability of its allied regime in Egypt rather than a democratic opportunity. Academic articles have shown that U.S. policy towards the Brotherhood has been completely subject to the logic of security and regional interests, not democratic values [24].

As for Israel, it saw the exclusion of the Brotherhood as a strategic gain, as it guarantees a weak Egyptian partner preoccupied with its internal crises, far from any popular or Sunni axis that threatens its expansionist projects. Numerous reports have shown that Tel Aviv supported the post-coup path as it provides a more secure environment on its southern borders and gas deals with comfortable terms [18].

As for the Muslim Brotherhood itself, it no longer has any neutral international mediator who can be involved in its patronage. The major powers will not risk a confrontation with the regime's regional supporters or with Washington and Tel Aviv. And with the group losing its international influence after 2013, it no longer has any external leverage to force the regime to sit down with it.

Therefore, the absence of international cover — and its transformation into a preventive and pressure force — makes reconciliation not only difficult but impossible. The regime, no matter how weak it becomes internally, will not risk losing the external supporters on which its survival depends.

Some may see the experiences of other countries as a model to follow in Egypt, but a closer look reveals fundamental differences that make reconciliation in the Egyptian case closer to impossible.

In Algeria, the military regime was able to launch the Civil Concord initiative and then the Charter for Peace and National Reconciliation (2005) at the beginning of the millennium, which allowed thousands of militants to return to civilian life [25]. But this would not have happened had the regime not had an internal will for reform, and had Algeria's economic situation not been much stronger than Egypt's today; the oil wealth provided the Algerian regime with a wide margin of manoeuvre that enabled it to buy stability. In Egypt, the will is completely absent, and the economy is drowning in debt and crises, which makes any reconciliation out of the question.

In Tunisia, the rise of the Ennahda movement led by Rached Ghannouchi represented a different model: the movement participated in the political process with flexibility, but the regime soon betrayed it with the 2021 coup led by Kais Saied, who overthrew the elected government and excluded Ennahda from the scene [26]. This experience is the clearest example of what could await the Brotherhood in Egypt if they accept a superficial reconciliation; a new betrayal as soon as the balances allow it.

As for South Africa, its historical transition took place through the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (1995) [27]. But this path was the result of an armed liberation movement supported regionally and internationally, which are circumstances that are not available in Egypt. The group does not have an armed force to pressure the regime, nor is there a regional will to adopt it.

Thus, invoking comparative experiences does not open a door to hope but confirms the impossibility: Algeria had a will and oil, Tunisia had flexibility but it ended in betrayal, and South Africa had arms and external support. As for Egypt today, it has no will, no economy, no pressure force, and no allies.

Reconciliation is not just a blank slate from which both sides win; it carries fundamental losses that make both of them wary of it.

First: The Military Regime's Losses

• The regime would lose the international support it gained primarily from its coup against the Islamists; the powers that funded and supported it (the UAE, Saudi Arabia, Israel, and the United States) will not accept a reconciliation that returns the Islamists to the scene.
• It would be forced to admit its major crimes: the massacres of Rab'a, al-Nahda, Ramses, and Al-Qaed Ibrahim, and the subsequent arrests, torture, and executions, crimes that have been documented by international organisations like Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch.
• It would lose the loyalty of the ruling class that was built on the exclusion and eradication of the Brotherhood, from the army to the police to the judiciary to the benefiting networks of businessmen.
• Media-wise, the lie of the narrative built over a decade would be exposed, from dramatic works like Al-Ikhtiyar to the continuous campaigns portraying the Brotherhood as "the people of evil."
• Most dangerously, it would lose absolute control over the Egyptian street; the presence of the Brotherhood as a critical reformist force would give the people a tool for accountability and pressure that the regime does not want at all.

Second: The Muslim Brotherhood's Losses

• They would lose a segment of popular support outside the group, especially from the non-ideological who sacrificed and believed in their fitness to lead. If they return through a settlement with the regime, it will be interpreted as a betrayal of the martyrs' blood.
• They would lose the trust of a broad segment of the victims' families and those who shed blood, from inside and outside the group, who see nothing greater than their blood, displacement, and suffering, and will not accept that it be compromised.
• Internally, reconciliation would lead to new rifts within the group between those who accept it and those who reject it, and the administrative and advocacy authority would weaken upon their return to Egypt, with no centralisation or ability to be decisive.
• Above all, they would not be safe from the regime's betrayal again; the group's collective memory is full of betrayals from every era: Nasser, Sadat, Mubarak, and now Sisi. Returning to a regime that cannot be trusted is not a return to work, but to a new trap.

In the end, I can only say that talking about a reconciliation between the Egyptian regime and the Brotherhood, at the present time, is a matter of impossibility.

In the previous article, I presented all the views that see the possibility of reconciliation and mentioned their arguments with transparency, while in this article, I have listed all the voices that consider it impossible, and mentioned their reasons with complete frankness.

It is in no way possible to overlook the revolutionary forces from outside the Brotherhood, nor the masses of people who sacrificed for principles without affiliations, nor the blood of the martyrs and the afflicted victims of the military coup. These are the ones who prefer death and judgment by a just rule rather than submitting to the rule of the new pharaohs and their henchmen, whose hands are stained with blood and who are mired in corruption.

As for what might happen later, it is unknown and can only be imagined as a miracle. Egypt today is like a speeding train without brakes, heading towards the unknown, and no one knows where the collision will be or when the catastrophe will occur. All this is happening under a reckless driver, who in his madness imagines he is capable of stopping the train with his wisdom, while the truth is that he is dragging the country towards the abyss.

People may differ in their description of reality or in their interpretation of its paths, but what is certain is that this generation will pay a heavy price in blood, freedom, and dignity. And if those who come after do not grasp the lessons of what has happened, the catastrophe will be repeated in a more horrific form. The most dangerous thing about tyranny is not just its brutality, but its ability to kill hope and normalise injustice in people's souls.

Therefore, the greatest responsibility falls on the new generation: to realise that the revolution is not a fleeting event, and that true reconciliation is not with corrupt rulers, but with our consciences and with our right to live with dignity and justice. Egypt today does not need bargains over blood, but a renewed awareness that restores people's confidence in themselves and in the fact that change is coming inevitably, no matter how long the night of tyranny lasts.

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