I recently read an article by Muhammad ibn Shams entitled "Who Declared the Ashʿarīs to Be Disbelievers?" (Man Qāla bi-Kufr al-Ashʿariyyah). The article brings together a substantial collection of quotations from scholars across different periods. As the author himself states, his purpose is to document statements made by scholars who declared the Ashʿarīs—or certain doctrines attributed to them—to be guilty of disbelief, rather than to provide a comprehensive analysis of the principles governing takfīr or to establish which position is ultimately correct.
Fairness requires that we begin where the evidence actually leads, rather than where we might wish it to lead.
There are, indeed, explicit statements in the Islamic scholarly tradition declaring the Ashʿarīs, or certain doctrines attributed to them, to be guilty of disbelief. Some of these statements are sufficiently explicit that their severity cannot reasonably be denied. It would therefore be historically inaccurate to claim that "no scholar ever declared the Ashʿarīs to be disbelievers."
But establishing that such statements existed is one thing. Establishing the broader conclusion that the article may lead its readers towards is something else entirely.
It is precisely here that important distinctions begin to disappear.
Collecting Quotations Is Not the Same as Defining the Point of Dispute
The article gathers several fundamentally different kinds of statements under a single heading.
Some scholars explicitly said things such as: "The Ashʿarīs are heretics (zanādiqah)" or "They are not Muslims."
Others declared a particular doctrine to constitute disbelief and then attributed that doctrine to the Ashʿarīs.
Others reported a particular Ashʿarī position and stated: "Whoever says this is a disbeliever."
Still others described Ashʿarīs using terms such as zandaqah or bidʿah, even though such terminology does not necessarily amount, in every author and every historical context, to a ruling that every individual belonging to the school has apostatised from Islam.
These distinctions are not exercises in semantic technicality. They lie at the very heart of the classical discussion of takfīr.
If a scholar says, for example, "Whoever says that the Qur'an is created has committed disbelief," this is a general ruling concerning a particular doctrine. Moving from that proposition to the conclusion that "every individual affiliated with a particular theological school is a disbeliever" requires an additional argument.
Ibn Taymiyyah himself repeatedly articulated this distinction. He explained that general or absolute takfīr (al-takfīr al-muṭlaq) does not necessarily entail declaring a particular individual to be a disbeliever (takfīr al-muʿayyan) until the relevant proof has been established against that person. He also maintained that a qualified scholar who exercises sincere ijtihād but errs in certain theological questions does not necessarily thereby fall into disbelief.
We cannot legitimately invoke one half of this principle while disregarding the other.
The Ashʿarism of the Fourth Islamic Century Is Not Necessarily the Ashʿarism of the Eighth—or the Fourteenth
This is one of the most important historical considerations largely absent from the article.
Whenever we encounter a fourth- or fifth-century Islamic text speaking about "the Ashʿarīs," we must first ask:
Which Ashʿarīs did the author have in mind, and which particular doctrine was he criticising?
Ashʿarī theology did not remain a single, entirely static intellectual system for nine centuries.
The differences between Abū al-Ḥasan al-Ashʿarī at various stages of his intellectual development, Ibn Fūrak, al-Bāqillānī, al-Juwaynī, al-Ghazālī, Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī, al-Āmidī, and later Ashʿarī theologians are well known to anyone seriously acquainted with the history of kalām.
Consequently, establishing that a fifth-century scholar declared a particular group of Ashʿarīs to be disbelievers is not, by itself, sufficient to establish a universal judgement concerning every person who subsequently identified with Ashʿarism.
One would still have to demonstrate that the doctrine for which that earlier scholar issued his judgement is actually held by the later or contemporary individual under discussion. One would also need to establish whether the scholar intended his judgement to apply to every individual affiliated with the school, rather than to a particular doctrine or a particular group among its adherents.
The sheer number of quotations cannot, by itself, establish any of these propositions.
Some of the Strongest Quotations Concern the Doctrine of the Qur'an
Consider, for example, the statement of Ibn Qudāmah cited in the article.
His language is undeniably severe, and there is little value in attempting to soften it artificially. He described certain people as zanādiqah. Yet Ibn Qudāmah did not leave the reader without explaining the doctrine that provoked this judgement. He discussed those who, in his understanding, maintained that what exists in the written muṣḥaf is not itself the Qur'an, but merely paper and ink, while the Qur'an that constitutes the Speech of God is something distinct from it.
We are therefore dealing with a specific theological proposition.
The methodological question is straightforward:
Does every person who identifies as Ashʿarī actually hold the precise doctrine that Ibn Qudāmah condemned in those terms?
If the answer is no, then Ibn Qudāmah's judgement concerning that doctrine cannot legitimately be transformed into the sweeping proposition:
«"Ibn Qudāmah declared every Ashʿarī to be a disbeliever simply because of his affiliation with Ashʿarism."»
The same methodological problem arises with the statement of Ibn Abī al-ʿIzz cited in the article. He is evaluating a particular conception of divine speech and argues that this conception ultimately leads to the doctrine of the createdness of the Qur'an. Indeed, he describes the position in extraordinarily severe terms, characterising it as even worse in disbelief than the position of the Muʿtazilah.
One may debate Ibn Abī al-ʿIzz's representation of Ashʿarī theology. One may also debate his judgement concerning the doctrine itself. But what cannot reasonably be done is to move from his criticism to a conclusion that he does not state in that passage: namely, that every individual who has ever identified as Ashʿarī is therefore a disbeliever.
Ibn Taymiyyah Cannot Be Reduced to the Phrase "O Apostates"
One of the most striking passages cited in the article is Ibn Taymiyyah's reported address to some of his opponents:
«"O corrupters, O apostates from the Sharīʿah, O heretics."»
Fairness requires acknowledging that this language exists. It should not simply be denied.
But does the investigation end there?
It does not.
Ibn Taymiyyah is himself one of the scholars who most extensively articulated the distinction between judging a statement and declaring a particular person who utters it to be outside Islam.
He repeatedly explains that a proposition may itself constitute kufr, while a particular individual who holds it is not necessarily declared a disbeliever until the proof has been established against him. He also maintains that a mujtahid who sincerely exerts his ability in seeking the truth and nevertheless reaches an erroneous conclusion may be forgiven for his error.
Moreover, in Darʾ Taʿāruḍ al-ʿAql wa-l-Naql, while discussing theological opponents, Ibn Taymiyyah acknowledges that some among them performed commendable services and possessed genuine virtues. He recognises their efforts in refuting atheists and other heterodox movements and in defending aspects of Sunni Islam—contributions, he says, that are evident to those familiar with their circumstances.
It is therefore methodologically unsound to extract the word "apostates" from one polemical context, disregard the many passages in which Ibn Taymiyyah carefully defines his principles of takfīr, and then declare:
«"This is Ibn Taymiyyah's judgement concerning all Ashʿarīs."»
That does not amount to a comprehensive reconstruction of Ibn Taymiyyah's position. It is selective quotation.
A more accurate formulation would be:
Ibn Taymiyyah was at times extremely severe in his criticism of particular Ashʿarī tendencies; he regarded certain doctrines as constituting disbelief, and severe expressions are found in his writings concerning some of his opponents. At the same time, however, he explicitly articulated methodological principles that prevent a general judgement of disbelief from automatically becoming a judgement of disbelief against every particular individual.
That formulation accounts for the full range of his statements rather than selecting only one part of them.
Contemporary Salafī Scholars
It is also important to recognise that even within modern Salafī scholarship, there has not been a single, uniform judgement on this question.
This point is difficult to avoid.
If the proposition is that "the Ashʿarīs are disbelievers according to Ahl al-Sunnah," how are we to account for explicit statements from major Salafī scholars rejecting precisely that conclusion?
Shaykh ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz ibn Bāz was directly asked whether the Ashʿarīs belonged to Ahl al-Sunnah wa-l-Jamāʿah and whether they should be regarded as members of another sect or as disbelievers.
His answer was explicit:
«"The Ashʿarīs are from Ahl al-Sunnah in most matters … and they are not disbelievers. Rather, among them are imams, scholars, and righteous people."»
At the same time, Ibn Bāz stressed that he regarded them as having departed from the Sunni position in certain questions concerning the divine attributes because of their use of figurative interpretation (taʾwīl).
This is significant precisely because Ibn Bāz was not an Ashʿarī defending his own theological tradition. He was one of the most influential representatives of modern Salafī scholarship and a prominent critic of Ashʿarī theology.
One is, of course, free to disagree with Ibn Bāz on this question. One may argue that other Sunni scholars adopted a more severe position.
What one cannot reasonably do, however, is narrate the history of the question as though declaring the Ashʿarīs to be disbelievers were the only position found within Sunni scholarship.
The historical record is considerably more complex.
Where, Then, Does the Problem Lie?
The problem is not the existence of scholars who declared Ashʿarīs to be disbelievers.
The problem lies in transforming their statements into a claim of consensus.
This is the central point.
If someone says:
«"I have found ten or twenty scholars who declared the Ashʿarīs to be disbelievers,"»
then he has established the existence of a scholarly position.
But if he then concludes:
«"Therefore, according to Ahl al-Sunnah, the Ashʿarīs are disbelievers,"»
he has advanced a different proposition altogether—one requiring independent evidence.
The fact that Sunni imams declared the Jahmiyyah, Muʿtazilah, certain Qadarī groups, or particular doctrines associated with those movements to constitute disbelief does not necessarily mean that each of those imams considered every individual affiliated with such movements to be an apostate merely by virtue of that affiliation.
Ibn Taymiyyah himself observed that some followers of the major imams adopted sweeping positions regarding the takfīr of certain innovators. Yet he also pointed out that explicit reports from the imams themselves contradict the indiscriminate excommunication of every person guilty of religious innovation. A doctrine may constitute disbelief without every person who holds it necessarily being judged a disbeliever, particularly where ignorance, interpretation, or other recognised impediments are present.
Distinguishing Between "Takfīr of a Doctrine" and "Takfīr of a Particular Individual"
This distinction is the key to the entire discussion.
A scholar may say:
«"This doctrine constitutes disbelief."»
That is a judgement concerning a proposition.
The next question is:
Does everyone who holds that proposition necessarily become a disbeliever?
Not necessarily.
A third question then follows:
Does every person affiliated with a school to which that proposition has been attributed actually hold it?
That conclusion is more remote still.
Then comes a fourth question:
If a particular person does hold that proposition, has the relevant proof been established against him, and have the recognised impediments to takfīr been removed?
That is yet another inquiry.
Collapsing these distinct levels into a single judgement is one of the most dangerous pathways to excess in takfīr.
Ibn Taymiyyah expressed the underlying principle clearly: general takfīr resembles a general threat of punishment; it does not necessarily entail declaring a particular individual to be a disbeliever until the proof has been established against him.
Excess in the Opposite Direction Must Also Be Rejected
Fairness, however, requires guarding against the opposite error.
The appropriate response is not to declare:
«"All Ashʿarīs are unquestionably Ahl al-Sunnah, and there is no meaningful dispute concerning them."»
That formulation is also insufficiently precise.
Ashʿarī theologians differed from the theology of the early traditionalist Sunnis in significant doctrinal questions. Ibn Bāz himself, despite explicitly refusing to declare them disbelievers, criticised their approach to the divine attributes and their employment of taʾwīl.
Nor should we deny that a number of prominent scholars associated with the tradition of Ahl al-Ḥadīth, the Ḥanbalī school, and others used extraordinarily severe language concerning particular Ashʿarī doctrines. Some explicitly pronounced takfīr.
Fairness must operate in both directions.
We should neither erase inconvenient parts of the scholarly tradition nor transform the statements of some scholars into a consensus simply because those statements happen to support our preferred position.
Beware of Misrepresentation
Muhammad ibn Shams's article may successfully establish that Sunni scholars existed who declared the Ashʿarīs—or doctrines attributed to them—to be guilty of disbelief.
What it does not establish merely by accumulating such quotations is that:
"The Ashʿarīs are disbelievers without qualification."
Nor does it establish that:
"Every individual who identifies as Ashʿarī is a disbeliever."
Nor that:
"Declaring the Ashʿarīs to be disbelievers is the unanimous position of Ahl al-Sunnah."
The more historically and methodologically accurate conclusion is this:
Throughout Sunni intellectual history, there have been scholars who dealt very severely with Ashʿarī theology. Some declared particular Ashʿarī doctrines to constitute disbelief; some explicitly pronounced takfīr upon particular groups among the Ashʿarīs; and some employed unequivocal language of disbelief and zandaqah. At the same time, other Sunni scholars did not declare the Ashʿarīs to be disbelievers. Some regarded them as belonging broadly to the Muslim community—and even, in certain respects, to Ahl al-Sunnah—while nevertheless regarding them as mistaken in important theological questions.
The real question, therefore, is not simply:
"Did any scholar ever declare the Ashʿarīs to be disbelievers?"
That is historically established.
The questions that require serious investigation are instead:
What exactly did the scholar declare to be disbelief? Whom exactly did he declare to be a disbeliever? Which doctrine was under discussion? Was he judging a proposition or a particular individual? Was his judgement directed at a specific Ashʿarī tendency, or at everyone affiliated with Ashʿarism? And does his judgement represent a scholarly consensus, or the position of one scholar—or one current—within the broader Sunni tradition?
These are the distinctions upon which a serious treatment of the subject must rest.
The responsible scholarly position is therefore neither to deny the existence of severe statements from earlier scholars nor to turn those statements into a weapon against every person who identifies with Ashʿarism.
Theological disagreement is one thing; takfīr is another.
Scholarly criticism is one thing; expelling a Muslim from Islam is another.
Perhaps the greatest danger in this entire discussion arises when statements by earlier imams concerning particular theological doctrines are transformed into sweeping judgements against scholars and ordinary Muslims solely on the basis of sectarian affiliation.
That is precisely the point that requires careful scholarly analysis—not merely an ever-growing collection of quotations.